-----Original Message-----
From: Darien Large []
Sent: Friday, October 02, 1998 8:04 AM
To: Keith M E
cc:
Importance: High
Subject: I could Write a Book
Folks, remember a couple of years ago when that physicist submitted a paper
to "Social Text", which turned out to be a complete hoax? His book is finally
out in English.
It's called "Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Philosophers' Abuse of
Science", and "The New Republic" gave it a glowing review; although they do
warn that it's likely to make a lot of people sick to their stomachs after a
few pages.
Alan Sokal is the fellow's name. The paper he submitted to "Social Text" is
entitled "Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics
of Quantum Gravity". Here's a sample of that paper from the review in TNR:
"""
Postmodern science provides a powerful refutation of the authoritarianism and
elitism inherent in traditional science, as well as an empirical basis for a
democratic approach to scientific work. For, as Bohr noted, "a complete
elucidation of one and the same object may require diverse points of view
which defy a unique description"-- this is quite simply a fact about the
world, much as the self-proclaimed empiricists of modernist science might
prefer to deny it. In such a situation, how can a self-perpetuating secular
priesthood of credentialed "scientists" purport to maintain a monopoly on the
production of scientific knowledge?...
A liberatory science cannot be complete without a profound revision of the
canon of mathematics. As yet no such emancipatory mathematics exists, and we
can only speculate upon its eventual content. We can see hints of it in the
multidimensional and nonlinear logic of fuzzy systems theory; but this
approach is still heavily marked by its origins in the crisis of late-
capitalist production relations. Catastrophe theory, with its dialectical
emphases on smoothness/discontinuity and metamorphosis/unfolding, will
indubitably play a major role in the future mathematics; but much theoretical
work remains to be done before this approach can become a concrete tool of
progressive political praxis.
"""
(You can read the entire article at Sokal's site, along with a lot of
commentary and the response by the editors of "Social Text".)
Here's a sample of the sort of nonsense Sokal and Bricmont dissect in their
book (this next bit is not a parody of anything; it's the real McCoy):
"""
Is E=mc^2 a sexed equation? Perhaps it is. Let us make the hypothesis that it
is insofar as it privileges the speed of light over other speeds that are
vitally necessary to us. What seems to me to indicate the possibly sexed
nature of the equation is not directly its uses by nuclear weapons, rather it
is having privileged what goes the fastest...
"""
Sokal and Bricmont's broader goal is to demonstrate the ways in which
progressive, postmodern, deconstructivist thinkers try to use science to
shore up their arguments and draw sweeping cultural, social and political
conclusions from scientific results to which they have no relevance. They
confine themselves to criticism of specifc misunderstandings of science and
mathematics, for the most part, because, in the words of the reviewer, "It's
impossible to refute a fog bank".
It may be of interest to note that Sokal describes himself as a leftist; this
book is really nowhere near, say, "Illiberal Education" in sentiment. He
claims to be trying to *save* progressive thought in his small way. Not
surprisingly, however, the criticism from the Left of his original hoax
called him a traitor and claimed he did more harm than good, by just handing
over ammunition to the reactionary Right.
And here's Keith's response:
-----Original Message-----
From: Keith M E [mailto: ]
Sent: Friday, October 02, 1998 10:24 AM
To: Darien Large
cc:
Subject: Re: I could write a book...
At 10/2/98 08:03 AM, Darien Large wrote:
>Folks, remember a couple of years ago when that physicist submitted a paper
>to "Social Text", which turned out to be a complete hoax? His book is
>finally out in English.
I followed this pretty closely when the article first appeared and the
controversy followed. I was initially almost gleeful to see the nonsense
which passes for much of a certain kind of academic discourse revealed for
what it is.
However, in defense of the journal "Social Thought" and its editors, it
should be noted that they accepted and published this paper *knowing and
_disclosing_ that it was outside of their academic expertise*, because they
were told by Sokal that physics journals wouldn't publish it. Although it
is likely that they should have had this paper peer-reviewed by physicists
anyway, they were in a bind: they were presented this paper (under false
pretenses) as something that the "traditional" physics establishment
wouldn't accept--who could they then go to for peer-review? As it
happened, they decided to trust Sokal's reputation and credentials as a
*physicist*, and published what they thought was an important paper that
commented at the intersection of their academic field and physics. The
impression that "Social Thought" regularly publishes this kind of
pseudo-science is false. That's the defense of the journal.
However, while I am quite uncomfortable with Sokal's deception and his
further erosion of academic credibility (which he claims to be defending),
I am sympathetic to his basic viewpoint. How many of us *haven't* heard
some post-modernist, litcrit mumbo-jumbo that throws in the current
pop-science buzzwords like "chaos theory" and the like? Not to mention the
horrible distortion of Heisenberg Uncertainty (and Relativity) regularly
used to bolster cultural (or philosophical) relativist arguments...
So-called "hard science" is and always has been abused by social
scientists, politicians, and demagogues since forever. That's not new.
Even the fundamental attack on knowledge and reason itself is not new--as
anyone who has read Plato certainly knows. We have always had the
Sophists, and we probably always will.
Yes, there's a degradation of the academy by the dubious and often
laughable "research" and theorizing that characterize many humanities and
social-science departments. But Physics has its share of cranks, as well;
scientists that imagine that their expertise in physics (or whatever)
translates into credibility and facility with often--are you ready?--social
science. Einstein, Oppenheimer, and Teller all were somewhat political
figures--regrettably, in my opinion .
Sokal, in exposing the way in which some on the academic left degrade
scientific thought, also himself degrades academic thought by committing
the *same sin as the people he is accusing*. That is, he believes he is
commenting on the academic integrity of the journals and academics that
"Social Thought" represents, but what the hell does he know about this
field? The editors of "Social Thought" were dismayed by the evident lack
of familiarity and comprehension of some of the ideas (outside of his
field) that he touches upon in his paper--they nevertheless published it,
*recognizing that Sokal was not a social scientist*.
At the College, I sat in on a question-and-answer session after a Friday
night lecturer (a tutor) attacked the same sorts of people, and invoked
Derrida, and other post-modernist philosophers. Several of the tutors
continued this theme in the discussion after the lecture. Unfortunately
for them (or fortunately, if they took advantage of it), Mr. Cates was
*quite* familiar with Derrida, and demonstrated that none of Derrida's
critics in the room *knew a damn thing about his work*. I don't know how
much I learned about Derrida that day, but I do know that I learned
something about academic discourse--even as it exists at somewhere as
"earnest" as St. John's College.
-Keith
-------------------------------------------------------------
"Hiss, shout, kick my teeth in, so what? I shall still tell
you that you are half-wits. In three months my friends and I
will be selling you our pictures for a few francs".
- Manifeste cannibale dada, Francis Picabia
-------------------------------------------------------------
Darien's response to Keith's response:
Date: Fri, 2 Oct 1998 16:29:48 -0500 (CDT)
From: Darien Large
To: Keith M E
cc:
Subject: Re: I could write a book...
On Fri, 2 Oct 1998, Keith M E wrote:
> I followed this pretty closely when the article first appeared and the
> controversy followed. I was initially almost gleeful to see the nonsense
> which passes for much of a certain kind of academic discourse revealed for
> what it is.
>
> However, in defense of the journal "Social Thought" and its editors, it
> should be noted that they accepted and published this paper *knowing and
> _disclosing_ that it was outside of their academic expertise*, because they
> were told by Sokal that physics journals wouldn't publish it. Although it
> is likely that they should have had this paper peer-reviewed by physicists
> anyway, they were in a bind: they were presented this paper (under false
> pretenses) as something that the "traditional" physics establishment
> wouldn't accept--who could they then go to for peer-review? As it
> happened, they decided to trust Sokal's reputation and credentials as a
> *physicist*, and published what they thought was an important paper that
> commented at the intersection of their academic field and physics. The
> impression that "Social Thought" regularly publishes this kind of
> pseudo-science is false. That's the defense of the journal.
>
Sokal's "stunt" is really problematic. The controversy that surrounded the
publication of his paper in "Social Text" was well-deserved. Was it
really fair, the way Sokal got his paper published? Probably not. If not,
was it worth the deception involved? Did the means justify the end? To
what purpose did Sokal submit his paper for publication? I don't know.
Apropos of this, though, I can report one minor detail from the review of
his book that is probably relevant to this question: Sokal's paper in
"Social Text" appeared in a special issue devoted to "science". I don't
know what else appeard in that issue, but I'm sure it would be important
to understand the context in which it was presented. I had no memory that
"Social Text" presented the paper with a disclaimer, and that's an
important thing to know.
Is Sokal making an argument against "interdisciplinary studies"? I can't
imagine any thoughtful person trying to make that case. A true
interdisciplinarian needs to understand the disciplines they're intering.
The *appropriation* of one field of knowledge for the purpose of another,
whether justified or not, is not an interdisciplinary approach at all.
It's more like reductionism.
When one considers the field of human knowledge as a whole, it seems to me
hard science is more often the victim, and *also* more often the
perpetrator of such misappropriations of knowledge. Why is this? Science
strives to the most certain and objective of all knowledge; so people are
inclined to build inappropriately on its foundations. Scientists aren't
immune to this--the pseudoscience of phrenology springs to mind as just
one example. Freudian psychology may be another.
It's also common to use hard science to lend an air of credibility to
areas of study that have no reasonable connection to it. Or at least Sokal
seems to think so. The way this happens seems more mysterious to me. But
if there's a real connection between Sokal's bugbears and, say, the way
quantum theory is tortured by non-physicists to say "You can't observe
something without affecting it", and try to apply that to anthropology,
then he's got something worthwhile to say.
> However, while I am quite uncomfortable with Sokal's deception and his
> further erosion of academic credibility (which he claims to be defending),
> I am sympathetic to his basic viewpoint. How many of us *haven't* heard
> some post-modernist, litcrit mumbo-jumbo that throws in the current
> pop-science buzzwords like "chaos theory" and the like? Not to mention the
> horrible distortion of Heisenberg Uncertainty (and Relativity) regularly
> used to bolster cultural (or philosophical) relativist arguments...
>
> So-called "hard science" is and always has been abused by social
> scientists, politicians, and demagogues since forever. That's not new.
> Even the fundamental attack on knowledge and reason itself is not new--as
> anyone who has read Plato certainly knows. We have always had the
> Sophists, and we probably always will.
>
> Yes, there's a degradation of the academy by the dubious and often
> laughable "research" and theorizing that characterize many humanities and
> social-science departments. But Physics has its share of cranks, as well;
> scientists that imagine that their expertise in physics (or whatever)
> translates into credibility and facility with often--are you ready?--social
> science. Einstein, Oppenheimer, and Teller all were somewhat political
> figures--regrettably, in my opinion .
What Sokal says he wants to do is warn people away from social scientists
who try to use hard science and mathematics to shore up their social,
cultural, literary theories. While it's true that a lot of scientists turn
political to varying degrees of success, it's much more rare that a hard
scientist tries to shore up their scientific theories using poorly
understood theories from cultural studies or literary criticism. There's
a real asymmetry here, it seems to me. A physicist who turns political may
be a dilletante or an interloper; a cultural critic who appropriates
physics for cultural-critical purposes is something different.
>
> Sokal, in exposing the way in which some on the academic left degrade
> scientific thought, also himself degrades academic thought by committing
> the *same sin as the people he is accusing*. That is, he believes he is
> commenting on the academic integrity of the journals and academics that
> "Social Thought" represents, but what the hell does he know about this
> field? The editors of "Social Thought" were dismayed by the evident lack
> of familiarity and comprehension of some of the ideas (outside of his
> field) that he touches upon in his paper--they nevertheless published it,
> *recognizing that Sokal was not a social scientist*.
You're really talking about his journal article here, right? The review in
TNR made it very clear that Sokal and Bricmont *in their book*, confine
themselves exclusively to gross misunderstandings of science and
mathematics by the postmodern social thought crowd. Their subject matter
is very narrow in the sense that the only sort of academic integrity they
challenge is the hard science and mathematics these people use and misuse
when writing about science, math, social theory, literary deconstruction,
politics or anything else.
Or so it seems, right? Surely they *invite* the reader to draw broader
conclusions and to question in a more general way the academic integrity
of these thinkers. The very strong *implication* must be something more
than the simple content of (I'm paraphrasing from an excerpt from the
book):
~~~
E=mc^2 has been verified to a very high degree of accuracy through
numerous experiment, and forms an essential part of a larger scientific
theory. Obviously the equation would not remain valid if "c" stood for a
speed other than the speed of light.
~~~
My mind goes back to Socrates when I think of Sokal's hoax.
Not in the admiring, reverent, breathless way I often speak of
Socrates, but in the way I'm sure many of his interlocuters felt
about him during their conversations. Socrates was not always the most
pleasant fellow to talk to. He wasn't always fair. In fact he made a lot
of people really mad, with good reason, too. He often tricked his victims
and trapped them in a mental corner. Socrates was a gadfly and a critic.
It seems to me his purpose (one of them, anyway) was to agitate the
complacent and question established truth. In other words, he was a
destroyer.
The question in my mind is, granted there's a lot of this crankery around,
so what? There are also a lot of UFOlogists around, but their influence on
mainstream academic thought (scientific or otherwise) is marginal. The
sort of thing Sokal calls attention to may be marginal in its field.
It's also an easy target, but then I can't help but believe the reviewer
is right to say that in many cases, the easy targets are the *only*
targets there really are. Everything else is just word-fog. That's not
the same thing as crankery, not the same thing at all.
Keith's response to my response to his response:
From: Keith M E [mailto: ]
Sent: Friday, October 02, 1998 6:04 PM
To: Darien Large
cc:
Subject: Re: I could write a book...
At 10/2/98 04:29 PM, Darien Large wrote:
>Sokal's "stunt" is really problematic. The controversy that surrounded the
>publication of his paper in "Social Text" was well-deserved. Was it
>really fair, the way Sokal got his paper published? Probably not. If not,
>was it worth the deception involved? Did the means justify the end? To
>what purpose did Sokal submit his paper for publication? I don't know.
To make a mockery of "Social Text", and post-modern mumbo-jumbo academic
theorists in general, surely.
Darien, partly I'm arguing with you about this because I've spent some time
in intimate contact with physicists and other "hard scientists"--and it is
hard to overstate both their arrogance about their comprehension of the
world, or their disdain of all intellectualism not their own. Might I
remind you of how low an opinion my friend Alison (an astrophysicist) had
of St. John's College? Or Murray Gell-Mann's swipe at the College during
the lecture of his I attended? Physicists are an exceedingly
intellectually arrogant lot.
Consider for a moment how many scientists you and I have read that complain
about Aristotle's ignorance, and bemoan the nefarious influence he had in
delaying empiricism. Yet, at the College we read Aristotle, and found (to
my surprise) that he was quite the empiricist--in some ways the
prototypical scientist. Have these modern scientific critics of Aristotle
actually read him? I would bet that most have not--they've merely read
*about* him, and his egregious errors (which I can't deny).
Certain parts of Aristotle are easy targets for modern critics--just as
"Social Text" is itself an easy target. But critics take aim at such easy
targets as a way of attacking the body of thought *as a whole*--as you
mention Sokal might be doing. This is where, I think, we should start (as
readers) becoming very critically aware ourselves.
>Apropos of this, though, I can report one minor detail from the review of
>his book that is probably relevant to this question: Sokal's paper in
>"Social Text" appeared in a special issue devoted to "science". I don't
>know what else appeard in that issue, but I'm sure it would be important
>to understand the context in which it was presented. I had no memory that
>"Social Text" presented the paper with a disclaimer, and that's an
>important thing to know.
I believe that the paper, and "Social Text's" response to the revelation of
their being duped, are available online somewhere.
>The *appropriation* of one field of knowledge for the purpose of another,
>whether justified or not, is not an interdisciplinary approach at all.
>It's more like reductionism.
>
>When one considers the field of human knowledge as a whole, it seems to me
>hard science is more often the victim, and *also* more often the
>perpetrator of such misappropriations of knowledge. Why is this? Science
>strives to the most certain and objective of all knowledge; so people are
>inclined to build inappropriately on its foundations. Scientists aren't
>immune to this--the pseudoscience of phrenology springs to mind as just
>one example. Freudian psychology may be another.
I would argue that so-called "hard-science" has been more arrogant than,
say, the humanities have been. Phrenology is but one example: the
nineteenth century was filled with an overweening scientific arrogance. It
was a naive reductionist empiricism that, I believe, many modern scientists
have yet to overcome. An old and offensive criticism of rationalism goes
like this: "What is the mathematics of 'Love'?" I've always been appalled
at this straw man argument by anti-rationalists--and then, sadly, been even
*more* appalled by the occasional rationalist that takes this question
seriously and tries to answer it.
>It's also common to use hard science to lend an air of credibility to
>areas of study that have no reasonable connection to it. Or at least Sokal
>seems to think so. The way this happens seems more mysterious to me. But
>if there's a real connection between Sokal's bugbears and, say, the way
>quantum theory is tortured by non-physicists to say "You can't observe
>something without affecting it", and try to apply that to anthropology,
>then he's got something worthwhile to say.
I agree; and, as you know, that example is one of my bugbears.
>What Sokal says he wants to do is warn people away from social scientists
>who try to use hard science and mathematics to shore up their social,
>cultural, literary theories. While it's true that a lot of scientists turn
>political to varying degrees of success, it's much more rare that a hard
>scientist tries to shore up their scientific theories using poorly
>understood theories from cultural studies or literary criticism. There's
>a real asymmetry here, it seems to me. A physicist who turns political may
>be a dilletante or an interloper; a cultural critic who appropriates
>physics for cultural-critical purposes is something different.
Yes, but a *physicist* may try to shore up his/her political/social
theories with ideas from their field of expertise. I've seen it. I'm not
a physicist, but *I've* done it. Keep in mind that many social sciences
have been "invaded" by hard-science, reductionist empiricists.
Sociobiology--which has a few good insights, and a great deal of
politically motivated crap--is one example. Do you remember "The Bell Curve"?
Secondly, there is an asymmetry here that I think that yourself and Sokal
are missing. That is that while the proper investigative domain of Physics
is physical interactions, the proper investigative domain of social-science
is social constructs--of which science, including physics, is certainly
numbered. The activity and organization of science is certainly a proper
subject of social science, and the ontological basis of science (and what
we understand as "physics") the proper subject of philosophical inquiry.
It is acceptable for "Social Text" to have special issue devoted to
"Science"; it is not appropriate for "Nuclear Physics" to have a special
issue devoted to race relations.
>My mind goes back to Socrates when I think of Sokal's hoax.
>Not in the admiring, reverent, breathless way I often speak of
>Socrates, but in the way I'm sure many of his interlocuters felt
>about him during their conversations. Socrates was not always the most
>pleasant fellow to talk to. He wasn't always fair. In fact he made a lot
>of people really mad, with good reason, too. He often tricked his victims
>and trapped them in a mental corner. Socrates was a gadfly and a critic.
>It seems to me his purpose (one of them, anyway) was to agitate the
>complacent and question established truth. In other words, he was a
>destroyer.
I don't think that Sokal's method is the Socratic method. If it were, he
would have undertaken a dialectic with a social-scientist on the topic of
one of the social-scientist's ideas. As it was, Sokal created--entirely on
his own--a straw man that he later knocked down. Socrates didn't put words
in people's mouth's--he let them put their feet there of their own accord
(but maybe with a little bit of midwifery on his part).
At any rate, I--like yourself and the TNR reviewer--like to see
pseudo-intellectuals revealed for the charlatans that they are. But I
think I'd also like to see Sokal hoisted by his own petard.[1]
-Keith
[1] What an archaic expression this is. Anyone interested in discovering
what a "petard" is, will likely be surprised--I was.
-------------------------------------------------------------
"Hiss, shout, kick my teeth in, so what? I shall still tell
you that you are half-wits. In three months my friends and I
will be selling you our pictures for a few francs".
- Manifeste cannibale dada, Francis Picabia
-------------------------------------------------------------
And finally putting it to bed almost two months later:
-----Original Message-----
From: Darien Large
Sent: Monday, November 30, 1998 11:25 PM
cc:
To: Keith M E
Subject: Unfashionable Nonsense
"Fashionable Nonsense" finally hit the bookstores in Austin, and I'm about
80% through it. I decided after our first round that, for myself, a final
judgment of Sokal's project was personally too important to be left to
second-hand reporting and half-informed arguments.
In the end, I have to say I come down on the side more of the Salon review
than on that of "The New Republic". Really the only thing Sokal has
accomplished here is, possibly, to stimulate a more critical reading of this
sort of posmodern writing for those who take its authority to be
significantly determined by its "scientific content". Basically, after
trudging through Sokal's book, I'm left with the same question as those
quoted in the Salon Review: "OK, so what?"
In fact, the greatest effect Sokal's book had on me was a desire to learn
more about postmodern criticism (I never thought I'd be saying *that*). What
intrigues me is the impression that the postmodern line of thought seems to
predicate its all-encompassing theorizing scope on the idea of the basic
unity of all human knowledge, and on the connectedness of all human
intellectual endeavors--which should appeal to anyone who identifies
themselves as a generalist as opposed to a specialist, and who believes in
the inherent worth of a "liberal education" as a foundation for any other,
more specialized learning, which I certainly do.
Sokal's book is really very little more than an encyclopedia of scientific
errors in the writings that Sokal excerpts; but on this slender thread,
Sokal in fact hangs a damning conclusion of all postmodern writing of the
genre. He loses the reader because, although the book ends up as a blanket
condemnation of this line of scholarship, he explicitly disavows this as his
intention. How can one really take him seriously, then, when he equivocates
in this way? One can't.
As I read, and read, and read, I came to realize that what is really needed
is a responsible critique from the philosophy of science, or the history and
sociology of science. Or, put another way, Sokal and Bricmont are
scientists, not philosophers, and what we need is a philosophical critique
from someone with a thorough understanding of the scientific content
involved. They *don't* have the authority to present a critique on the
scale that their book implies (but explicitly denies). The problem with the
authors they dissect is that *they* believe they can present this critique;
yet they lack some essential skills to do that in any relevant or
responsible way.
There really is a kind of symmetry here: Sokal's targets know so little
about the science they use to create their theories, that I can't take them
seriously; but Sokal has so little deep understanding of the "construction
of scientific theories", and their development and conditioning by the
context in which they're found, that his catalog of errors ends up looking
like a report from a glorified spell-checker. Again, when all is said and
done, I keep asking myself, "Who cares?"
It seems to me that the *act* of scientific investigation (taking
measurements, making observations) requires the scientist to adopt a kind of
empirical/realist attitude. That is, one has to believe that the
observations one makes of the "external world" does in fact have something
significant to say about the nature and structure of reality. But once
these facts are assembled into a theory, and once that theory itself becomes
a tool for understanding the world, anyone who claims to understand the
meaning and function of scientific theories in a broad sense, must also
realize that the way in which the theories function is to condition our
understanding of things beyond those which we used to create this theory in
the first place.
Although observation has significance for our understanding of "reality",
exactly what that significance is, is problematic. This is very important to
understand. When one takes a few steps back from a more or less
comprehensive scientific theory (such as relativity, say, or quantum
physics), it becomes rather striking that it takes on the shape of a
more-or-less self-contained *system of concepts*, in which the question of
the *reality* of the things it refers to has no place to gain a foothold. In
this sense I can only say that the postmodern "reading" of science is
provocative, relevant, and more or less accurate.
(Perhaps there's something significant here when one tries to make a
distinction between "science" and "mathematics"? I mean, the mathematician
says publicly that their work concerns *only* the formal structure of the
systems they investigate, and that they construct mathematical facts rather
than discover them; yet when engaged in mathematical research, one has to
adopt the attitude that your object of study is in some sense "already
there", and that it's an *actual* object. Someone else put this idea
succinctly: "All mathematicians are closet Platonists". Whereas the
scientist does the opposite: publicly they declare that they investigate
*reality*, but at the end of the day one must realize that what you're left
with is a system whose persuasiveness comes more or less only from internal
evidence, and whose strongest features are consistency and comprehensiveness
rather than a direct appeal to "objective facts". But I digress.)
Surely it's going overboard to refer to these scientific theories as "just
another discourse", and to claim that they ultimately *imprison* our
understanding in a jail of its own making (and from which there is no
escape); but this critique has more than a grain of truth to it, however
facile. Surely this idea is grossly abused in these postmodern circles, but
I don't see anyone else who appreciates this terribly important idea,
either.
Sokal, in the end, confuses the naive realism of observation-gathering and
logical progressions with a deeper understanding of "science" understood as
a whole. A fact-gathering scientist uses logical and rational tools to
follow the trail of empirical evidence to arrive at general conclusions that
this evidence leads us to; and a scientific attitude is based on the idea
that this method is an essential ingredient in any comprehensive view of the
world. But that activity is not the *whole* of the scientific project, much
less the ultimate goal of "science". Once you've finished your experiments
and worked out what it is they tell you, how they answer your questions, you
must also be able to apply a more general criticism to your project
considered "as a whole". Anything less is just little better than technical
raw material. In other words, a true scientist must really be a philosopher
as well. As far as I can tell, Sokal is neither.
The following ellipsis-delimited text is from the second page of the Salon
review that Kevin forwarded; it encapsulates my own conclusions about
Sokal's real accomplishment in his book and elsewhere.
Yours,
Darien
--------------------------------
"Because time is NOT an option."
--------------------------------
(You can also read the entire Salon review)
...
Indeed, when I talked over the phone with French theorist Sylvere Lotringer
about what he makes of "Fashionable Nonsense," he dismissed its critique as
justified only insofar as it is picayune. Sokal, he quipped, "is like a huge
dinosaur with a very small head. He wants to criticize and he has reasons to
criticize the details. But who cares? The point is, he doesn't address the
theories themselves ... If he had attacked the concept by showing that
there's an intrinsic relation between the error in a paragraph and the
possibility of the concept, that would become meaningful, but his becoming a
cop is not very interesting." Co-editor of Semiotext(e), which has long
printed French theory titles for American audiences, including many by
"Fashionable Nonsense's" targets, Lotringer said he had talked to
Baudrillard and Virilio after the book's French release. "No one that I
talked to denies that they could have been wrong [on matters of mathematics
and science]. But they think it's not a really important thing -- the
argument doesn't rely on the accuracy of the detail."
University of California at Santa Cruz history of consciousness professor
Donna Haraway, who was backhandedly praised in Sokal's hoax, takes
Lotringer's point one step further: "I don't expect people I learn from not
to make mistakes. I've made some errors. I've used some metaphors that
haven't gone where I wanted them to. Sometimes we're arrogant. But expecting
something else is to cast a false impression of what it means to be an
intellectual." By implying that these theorists are debunked by errata, she
continued, "Sokal and Bricmont produce the phenomenon they attribute to
others. If we deify thinkers, it's our fault, our failing, not theirs."
...
...
If "Fashionable Nonsense" gains strength from its modest scope, these
limitations also constitute its weakness. In the end, Sokal and Bricmont
recommend that leftist postmodernism shed its relativism and reduce itself
to claims based on good old-fashioned empirical evidence. But they are
careful to give us no idea what such claims might be -- since this subject
falls outside their expertise. It's easy to admire their consistency and
modesty. But without such positive suggestions, they end up coming off as
dogmatic and censorious. As Haraway has put it: "Sokal is working as an
inquisitor. He's the Kenneth Starr of the intellectual world."
...